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Abstract
Malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures, it is widely argued, confers dispropor-
tionate bene¯ts to overrepresented jurisdictions. Ample empirical research has documented
that unequal representation produces unequal distribution of government expenditures in
bicameral legislatures. The theoretical foundations for this empirical pattern are weak. It
is commonly asserted that this stems from unequal voting power per se. Using a non-
cooperative bargaining game based on the closed-rule, in¯nite-horizon model of Baron and
Ferejohn (1989), we assess the conditions under which unequal representation in a bicameral
legislature may lead to unequal division of public expenditures. Two sets of results are de-
rived. First, when there is unequal voting power but equal proposal power, the equilibrium
expected payo®s of all House members are, surprisingly, equal. Second, we show three sit-
uations where small-state biases can emerge: (1) when there are supermajority rules in the
malapportioned chamber, (2) when the Senate initiates bills, which produces maldistributed
proposal probabilities, and (3) when the distributive goods are \lumpy."
1. Introduction
Bicameralism is common among the world's democracies. It is also common for one
chamber to represent population and the other to represent geographical areas. This ar-
rangement often emerges as a compromise, perhaps unavoidable, in the formation of the
nation or union to balance the representation of people and of states or areas. The result
is malapportionment, with highly unequal representation of the population in at least one
chamber of the legislature.1 Political theorists, most notably Robert Dahl (2002), criticize
this institutional design for the inequity in voting power that it necessarily produces. Empir-
ical researchers have documented that malapportionment results in substantial e®ects on the
distribution of government expenditures. In a wide range of bicameral legislatures, there is
a strong, positive association between a geographic area's per capita seats in the legislature
and the share of public expenditures it receives.2
Less certain is why malapportionment in bicameral legislatures produces unequal divi-
sions of public spending. Most often, it is argued that the voting power of over-represented
areas leads directly to their disproportionate in°uence over government spending decisions.3
The intuition behind these arguments comes from theoretical results derived for the uni-
cameral legislatures. In a single legislative body, politicians with greater voting weight will
receive higher shares of the division of the public dollar (Shapley and Shubik xxxx). How-
1Lijphart (1982) documents the severity of malapportionment in 6 bicameral legislatures: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. Samuels and Snyder (2001) document this
for a wide set of countries for the current period. They ¯nd that when severe malapportionment exists it is
typically in the upper chamber. The worst cases are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, United
States, Switzerland, Russian Federation, Venezuela, Chile, Australia, Spain, Germany, Mexico, South Africa,
and Poland. In all these countries, the index of malapportionment in the upper house is .20 or higher. In all
cases the index of malapportionment in the lower house is less than half as large as that for the upper house,
and in most cases it is less than one-fourth as large. David and Eisenberg (1961) document the situation in
the U.S. states for the 50 years prior to the Baker v. Carr decision.
2See Atlas, et al. (1995), Lee (1998, 2000), and Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) for studies of federal
spending in the U.S. states; see Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2000) for a study of U.S. state spending
prior to 1960; see Gibson, Calvo and Faletti (1999) for a study of Argentina and Brazil; see Rodden (2001,
2002) for studies of the German Lander and the European Union; and see Horiuchi and Saito (2001) for a
study of Japan.
3Frances Lee (2000) puts it is follows: \The great variation in state population means that some states
have far greater need for federal funds than others, but all senators have equal voting weight. As a result,
even though all senators' votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal `price.'
Coalition builders can include bene¯ts for small states at considerably less expense to program budgets than
comparable bene¯ts for more populous states." See also, Dahl (2002), Felsenthaler and Machover (xxxx),
Rodden (xxxx), xxxx.
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ever, as Buchanan and Tullock (1962) observe, the logic of bargaining in a single legislative
chamber does not necessarily map into a bicamal setting. The unicameral reasoning applies
only if one could treat members of the upper and lower chambers as independent actors in a
single legislature. But, legislators' preferences in the two chambers are typically not indepen-
dent, because members of the lower house represent areas within the geography represented
by a upper house.
What is the logic of bargaining over the division of public expenditures in bicameral
legislatures? The most common analytical tools for the analysis of legislative bargaining
and coalition formation come from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley-Shubik
index and the Banzhaf index.4 As is well known, cooperative game theory models of voting
power do not incorporate potential di®erences in proposal power of areas stemming from
unequal representation. These measures also do not readily accomodate institutional rules or
correlated preferences, as arises in the bicameral setting. Indeed, almost all of the previous
work on coalition formation in bicameral legislatures assumes that the preferences of the
legislators in the two chambers are independent.5 This assumption is made in order to apply
of the voting power indices to the bicameral problem, but it is almost surely wrong.
We analyze divide-the-dollar politics in a bicameral legislature using the non-cooperative
legislative bargaining model developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In this framework,
a legislator is randomly chosen to make a proposal about how to divide a dollar among all
legislators; then, voting on the proposals occurs. The expected share of public spending that
any legislator gets equals what he or she gets when he or she makes a proposal times the
likelihood that happens plus what the legislator must be paid in order to join a coalition
times the likelihood that the legislator is included in a coalition.6
4See, e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1954), Deegan and Packel (1978), Dubey and Shapley (1979), Brams
(1989), Brams, A®uso, and Kilgour (1989), and Konig and Brauninger (1996). Diermeier and Myerson
(1999) is one of the few papers using a non-cooperative approach. There is also a small literature examining
whether bicameralism produces unbeatable points in a multi-dimensional issue space, which can be viewed
as a hybrid|e.g., Cox and McKelvey (1984), Hammond and Miller (1987), Tsebelis (1993), and Tsebelis
and Money (1997).
5See, e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1954), Deegan and Packel (1978), Dubey and Shapley (1979), Brams
(1989), Brams, A®uso, and Kilgour (1989), Konig and Brauninger (1996), and Diermeier and Myerson
(1999). Konig and Brauninger (1996) consider cases where legislators are divided into political parties and
the chambers are \linked" because the same political parties operate in both.
6Banks and Duggan (2000) prove equilibrium existence for a general class of legislative bargaining games.
For an alternative non-cooperative approach to legislative bargaining, see Morelli (1999). The only other
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Within this framework we can ascertain the expected division of public expenditures
under a range of institutional arrangements or rules. Proposals may originate in the House
or the Senate. Voting rules can be altered to allow majority rule or supermajority rule, and
proposals can be considered under closed or open rules.
We begin by considering the simplest case: proposals originate in the House, may not be
amended by the Senate, and must be approved by majority rule in each chamber. We focus
on this case to isolate the argument that unequal voting power per se predicts maldistribu-
tion of public spending. In this situation, the opportunity to make proposals is allocated
evenly across population because House districts are assumed to have equal populations
and because every House member has the same probability of being chosen as a proposer.
The voting power of the areas di®ers because of unequal representation of population in
the Senate. Surprisingly, as we show below, the standard non-cooperative legislative bar-
gaining model predicts an equal (expected) division of public expenditures in this case. As
a practical, matter this case emerges in many real world legislatures. Tsebelis and Money
(xxxx) document that many bicameral systems operate this way. In the large majority of
bicameral legislatures, the lower house initiates money bills. For example, the U.S. House of
Representatives. In some, such as Australia and the Netherlands, the upper house cannot
amend.
We then consider the e®ects of three factors (1) supermajority rules, such as the cloture
rules of the U.S. Senate, (2) Senate proposal power, and (3) the nature of public expenditure
programs. The European Union provides an important case where the upper chamber (the
Council of Ministers) proposes money legislation, and the lower chamber (the European
parliament) votes whether to reject these bills (Tsebelis and Money, xxxx, Table 2.2B).
Our formalization also advances non-cooperative models of legislative bargaining and
coalition formation. Over the last 15 years, an extensive literature, much of it in this
Review, has developed the non-cooperative theory of legislative bargaining based on the
Baron-Ferejohn model. All of this research examines a legislature with a single chamber,
signi¯cantly limiting the application of theoretical resesarch. None of the unicameral non-
paper we have found that explicitly models the linkage between the two chambers in a bicameral legislature
is Kalandrakis (n.d.). He assumes that the utility functions of the Senators and House members in a state
are not just linked but are the same. This is a very restrictive assumption. For a Senator to agree to vote
for a proposal requires that all House members in the Senator's state would also vote for that proposal.
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cooperative legislative bargaining models apply, for example, to the U.S. Congress or to 49 of
the American states. We forward a framework within which to analyze bicameral legislative
bargaining. Many extensions of this model are possible, even encouraged.
The immediate implication of our analysis is that, in a bicameral legislature, unequal vot-
ing power itself is not su±cient to explain maldistribution of government spending. When
there is majority rule, equal proposal power, and unequal voting power (in the upper cham-
ber), then bargaining theory surprisingly predicts an equal division of the public expenditure.
To produce maldistribution of public expenditures in the non-cooperative bicameral bargain-
ing game, the rules of the institution must also be such that there is unequal \proposal power"
or supermajority constraints as well as unequal \voting power."
We now turn to the analytical demonstration of these claims.
2. Basic Model
We analyze a variant of the closed-rule, divide-the-dollar game studied by Baron and
Ferejohn (1989). In the bicameral setting, we must make further assumptions about the
structure of the politics in order to characterize how agreements are reached across chambers.
We begin with one speci¯c formulation of the problem { the House initiates bills { and then
consider variations on this set up. Our assumptions about the structure of the bicameral
setting are as follows:
A1. The lower chamber (House) represents districts with equal population and the up-
per chamber (Senate) represents states, each containing di®erent numbers of districts.
Public expenditures are divisible to the district level.
A2. Legislators are responsive to their median voters. In order for a legislator to support a
proposal the proposal must give some money to at least half of a legislator's voters. If
a coalition gets, say, one of three House members from a state, that coalition will not
get the support of the Senator, as the Senator would require funds to go to at least 2
districts.
A3. The lower chamber moves ¯rst, and the other chamber votes on that proposal without
amendment, i.e., under a closed rule. The closed rule is surely a special case, but it
means that we do not have to model the resolution of di®erences between the chambers.
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Modeling that additional decision process adds a layer of complication that is not
needed to gain important insights.
Assumption A1 describes the link between House members and Senators: the geographic
areas of representation are nested, as in the U.S. Congress. One may imagine violations of
this assumption, as occurs in some state legislatures where assembly district boundaries cut
across senate district boundaries. Those lead to greater independence of coalition formation
across the legislative chambers. When the district boundaries are independently drawn, this
becomes essentially a unicameral problem. But, most bicameral legislatures nest districts,
completely or to a high degree.
Assumption A2 characterizes the decision rule for House members and Senators. If a
majority of the House members in a state are in a coalition then the Senator from the state
will wish to join that coalition. We can vary this assumption, as suggested in the discussion
of lumpy goods in the fourth section. However, the simple majority rule approximates the
behavior of legislators in practice.7
Assumption A3 de¯nes the proposal power. Importantly, we assume for the basic model
that voting power is unequal but proposal power is equal. We consider the case of unequal
voting power and unequal proposal power in the fourth section.
We formalize these assumptions as follows.
There are two legislative chambers, a House and a Senate. Seats in the House are
apportioned on a per-capita basis, while seats in the Senate are apportioned geographically.
For convenience we refer to geographical units as states. Each state has a type, identi¯ed
by population, and there are at least two types of states. A type-t state gets 1 seat in the
Senate and t seats in the House, where t 2 Z+. Let mt ¸ 0 be the number of type-t states,
and nt = mtt be the number of House seats from type-t states. Let T denote the size of
the largest state. The total number of seats in the House is then n =
PT
t=1 nt =
PT
t=1mtt
and the total number of seats in the Senate is m =
PT
t=1mt. We assume that n and m are
both odd. We call the House legislators representatives, and we call the Senate legislators
senators. We equate each representative with his district, and each senator with his state.
7We examined all roll call votes in the U.S. House and Senate from 1989 to 2000 involving ¯nal passage
on appropriations and authorizations. When a majority of a state's House delegation supports a money
proposal, that state's Senators vote for the bill 90 percent of the time. When a majority of a states' House
delegations votes against a bill, the Senators vote for the bill 64 percent of the time.
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Legislators in both chambers wish to maximize the expected utility of their constituency's
median voter. We assume that voters in each district have identical, quasi-linear preferences.
Further, spending is indivisible at the level of the House district|that is, it consists of local
government expenditure programs consumed by all voters in the district. Thus, representa-
tives simply wish to maximize the funds °owing to their district. Because they may represent
multiple districts, senators care not only about the quantity of goods °owing to their state,
but also the distribution thereof. A type-t senator attempts to maximizes the bene¯t of the
dt-th highest per-district bene¯t that a bill promises in a type-t state, where dt = (t+1)=2
(t odd) or t=2+1 (t even). The idea is that we are studying distributive spending, and any
spending that goes into a district is valued both by the House member from that district
and the senator from the state containing the district.
All proposals originate in the House. In period 1, Nature randomly draws one represen-
tative to be the proposer, who proposes a division of the dollar across representatives (House
districts). Formally, a proposal is an n-dimensional vector from the set X = fx j xi 2
[0; 1];
Pn
i=1 xi · 1g. All legislators in both chambers then simultaneously vote for or against
the proposal. If the proposal receives a majority in both chambers, then the dollar is divided
and the game ends. If the proposal is rejected, then a new representative is randomly drawn
to be the proposer. The game has an in¯nite horizon, and no discounting.
To identify coalitions, we adopt the following notation. Let N be the set of all rep-
resentatives (districts), and for each t = 1; : : : ; T , let Nt be the set of all representatives
(districts) from type-t states. If C is any coalition of representatives, let Nt(C) be the set
of representatives in C from type-t states. Let nt(C) be the total number of representatives
in Nt(C), and let n(C) =
PT
t=1 nt(C) be the total number of representatives in C. For each
state j, let Nj(C) be the set of representatives in C that are drawn from j , and let nj(C)
be the number of representatives in Nj(C). Analogously, let Mt(C) be the set of type-t
states such that C contains at least (t+1)=2 representatives from each of these states, and
let mt(C) be the number of states in Mt(C). Thus, Mt(C) can be thought of as the set of
senators from type-t states that are \in" C, and mt(C) can be thought of as the number of
senators from type-t states that are \in" C. Let M(C) = [Tt=1Mt(C) be the set of senators
\in" C, and let m(C) =
PT
t=1mt(C) be the total number of senators \in" C. We call a
coalition C winning if and only if n(C) ¸ (n+1)=2 and m(C) ¸ (m+1)=2. Denote by
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W = fC j n(C) ¸ (n+1)=2 and m(C) ¸ (m+1)=2g the set of winning coalition.
The game can be treated as a sequence of identical subgames, where each subgame begins
with nature's move to draw a proposer. We look for symmetric, stationary, subgame perfect
equilibria (SSSPE's). Our de¯nition of symmetry is that all representatives of the same type
are treated symmetrically, although di®erent types may be treated di®erently.8 Stationarity
means that each legislator uses history-independent strategies at all proposal-making stages,
and voting strategies that only depend on the current proposal. This implies that we may
suppress notation for time and game histories.
For all types t = 1; : : : T , SSSPE strategies are then as follows. A proposal strategy for
a type-t representative is wt 2 ¢(X), where ¢(X) is the set of probability distributions
over X. Voting strategies for type-t representatives and senators are yt : [0; 1] ! f0; 1g
and zt : [0;1=dt]! f0; 1g, respectively, mapping allocations into votes, where a 1 represents
approval.
SSSPE's have the following properties, which simplify the analysis. By symmetry, for each
type t, the continuation value of all type-t representatives at the beginning of each subgame
will be equal. By stationarity, these values will also be the same for each subgame. Let vt
and vst be the continuation values of type-t representatives and senators at the beginning
of each subgame, respectively. At an SSSPE, the proposer must o®er at least vt to a type-
t representative in order to obtain that representative's support for his proposal (that is,
yt(xi) = 1 for legislator i of type t i® xi ¸ vt). Likewise, the proposal must o®er at least
vst to a type-t senator in order to gain her vote. Note that a type-t senator's allocation
is e®ectively an \order statistic" indicating the dt-th highest per-district bene¯t that a bill
promises to the state. Since a proposal will pass if and only if it receives majority support
in both chambers, it must o®er at least vt to (n+1)=2 representatives and vst to (m+1)=2
senators.
3. Main Results
The assumptions A1, A2, and A3 describe the situation where there is unequal voting
8This is the de¯nition of symmetry employed by Baron and Ferejohn; it is somewhat non-standard for
game theory. Symmetry here means that within type the equilibrium strategy is symmetric. If this is not the
case, as Baron and Ferejohn (xxxx) note, a range of payo® distributions can be sustainable. This assumption,
however, does not arti¯cially constrain the equilibrium strategies across types.
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power but equal proposal power. In equilibrium, the expected share of public expenditures
is the same in all districts|the expected division of expenditures is not skewed toward the
areas that are over-represented in the Senate. The intuition behind this conjecture is as
follows. To build a winning coalition, a proposer collects a majority of districts. Because
the proposer keeps the surplus from any bargain, the proposer wishes to build the lowest
cost minimal winning coalition. Under simple majority rule it is possible to do this without
having to distribute any money solely in order to obtain votes in the Senate. As a result, the
\marginal value" of any Senator to the coalition is zero. Small states therefore do not have
disproportionate bargaining power even though they have disproportionately more votes.
To show this claim, we proceed in two steps. Our ¯rst result identi¯es a fundamental
relationship between chambers.
Proposition 1. Suppose C is a coalition such that m(C) = (m+1)=2, nj(C) = (t+1)=2
(where t is state j's type) for all j 2 M(C), and nj(C) = 0 for all j =2 M(C). If M(C)
contains all states with t > 1, then n(C) = (n+1)=2. If M(C) does not contain all states
with t > 1, then n(C) < (n+1)=2.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
That is, if a coalition C has just enough representatives drawn from just enough states to
win the Senate, then C either is a minimal winning coalition in the House or it loses in the
House. A bare victory the Senate typically leaves the proposer short of winning the House.
Intuitively, this implies that no minimum winning majority in the Senate is less desirable in
the sense of requiring more than a minimum winning majority in the House. Thus, from a
simple counting perspective, attracting a su±cient number of votes from the malapportioned
chamber is not a binding constraint. Any small-state advantage in an SSSPE must therefore
arise from variations in vt or vst across types.
To keep the analysis simple, we search for an equilibrium satisfying vt ¸ vst for all t. This
relationship is obviously true for type t = 1, as v1 = vs1. In the equilibrium that we identify,
the inequality becomes strict for t > 2. We will show that this restriction produces a unique
distribution of expected payo®s in the class of SSSPEs. We suspect that all SSSPEs satisfy
this condition, but leave the question for future work.
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This restriction links the chambers in the following, deterministic way: the senator from
a state will support a bill if more than half of the state's representatives support it. So, to
obtain the support of a state's senator, it is su±cient for proposers to pay a majority of its
representatives their reservation values. The following result shows that in equilibrium, it is
also necessary; that is, if vst < vt, no representative ever receives vst .
Lemma. If vt ¸ vst 8t, then there is no optimal coalition in which xk 2 (0; vt) for any
representative k of type t.
Our problem is therefore reduced to one of characterizing winning House coalitions that
are drawn from the states in such a way as to include more than half of the representa-
tives in more than half of the states. For each coalition C µ N, let v(C) = Pt2T vtnt(C)
be the total \cost" of C. Clearly, v(N) = 1. For each type-t representative, let vt =
minfCjC\Nt6=;;C2Wg v(C) be the minimum-value winning coalition for a type-t proposer (in-
cluding herself). Then the minimum that a type-t proposer must pay her coalition partners
is vt¡vt. Let Ct be the set of coalitions that solve the problem: minfCjC\Nt6=;;C2Wg v(C).
Thus, Ct is the set of \cheapest" coalitions for a type-t representative. At an SSSPE, each
type-t proposer chooses some C 2 Ct, o®ers vr to all type-r representatives in C other than
herself, o®ers 0 to all representatives outside C, and keeps 1¡v(C)+vt = 1¡vt+vt for herself.
For each type-t representative, let qt be the average probability that the representative
is chosen as a coalition partner, given that someone other than the representative is the
proposer. Then the continuation value for a type-t representative satis¯es
vt =
1
n
(1¡vt+vt) + n¡1n qtvt:
Or,
vt =
1 ¡ vt
(n¡1)(1¡qt) : (1)
Proposition 1 and the Lemma provide su±cient leverage for us to identify the following,
\unique" SSSPE in the bicameral bargaining game.9
Proposition 2. An SSSPE exists. Any SSSPE satis¯es vt = 1=n for all t.
9Note that because of the restriction vt ¸ vst , we cannot invoke the results of Banks and Duggan (2000)
in establishing uniqueness.
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Thus, the House districts in large states will not have lower expected payo®s than the
House districts in small states. Since the House districts are apportioned on a per-capita
basis, voters in large states are worse-o® than voters in small states if and only if the expected
payo®s to the large-state House districts are smaller than the expected payo®s to the small-
state House districts. Thus, the proposition says that voters in large states are not worse-o®
than voters in small states.
4. Extensions: Possible Sources of Small-State Bias
Proposition 2 above shows that when both chambers require simple majorities to pass bills
and the Senate cannot propose or amend bills, over-representation in the Senate does not lead
to a bias in expected allocations in purely distributive policy areas. That is, di®erences in
voting power per se in one chamber do not automatically translate into di®erences in expected
payo®s. Something else is required to explain distributive biases in favor of small states. In
this section we consider three factors that can produce small-state biases: supermajoritarian
requirements in the Senate, proposal power in the Senate, and \lumpy" distributive goods.
4.1. Supermajoritarian Rules
Supermajority rules, such as the cloture requirement in the U. S. Senate, can create small
state biases. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that the marginal value of a Senator
is e®ectively zero: it is possible to build minimal winning coalitions in the House that
guarantee a minimal winning coalition in the Senate. With supermajority rules in the upper
chamber, the proposer may be forced to buy some small state Senators in order to clear the
supermajority hurdle. The marginal value of small state Senators, then, becomes non-zero,
and small states are able to extract additional payments for their legislative votes. The
extreme case is when unanimity is required in the Senate. When all Senators must be in the
coalition, money is divided equally among the states, but on a per capita basis this results in
an unequal distribution of expenditures to people across states. Supermajority hurdles in the
lower chamber, by assumption apportioned on the basis of population, lessen the small-state
bias.
To simplify the analysis, we focus on a special case with two types of states, one type
with a single district and the other with k ¸ 3 districts. The total number of states is
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m = mk+m1, and the total number of districts is n = kmk+m1.
Let QS ¸ (m+1)=2 be the number of votes required to pass a bill in the Senate, and
let QH ¸ (n+1)=2 be the number required in the House. For simplicity, we assume QH <
m1 +(kmk+1)=2.10 Also, let rk = b(kmk+1)=(k+1)c, where bxc is the greatest integer
less than or equal to x. Then rk is the maximum number of type-k senators a proposal can
attract if the proposal attracts the votes of exactly (kmk+1)=2 type-k representatives.
Proposition 3. There is a bias in favor of small states|i.e., vk < v1|if and only if
QS > rk + QH ¡ (kmk + 1)=2.
Several comparative statics reveal the e®ects of supermajority hurdles on biases.
First, if QS is a simple majority of the Senate, then the necessary and su±cient condition
for small state bias will not be met. IfQH is a simple majority in the House, then a su±ciently
high QS produces small state bias. At the extreme with unanimity rule in the Senate and
simple majority rule in the House, the necessary and su±cient condition certainly holds.
Second, raising QH makes the necessary and su±cient condition more di±cult to obtain.
At the extreme where there is unanimity rule in both the House and the Senate then the
necessary and su±cient condition cannot hold.
Third, raising rk also makes the necessary and su±cient condition for small state bias
more di±cult to obtain. The term rk is increasing in m and k. The intuition is that as m
or k rises, the number of type-k states that are bought grows when buying exactly just over
1=2 of the type-k House members. In the limit, all type-k states are won. This makes small
state Senators less vital to the coalition.
An example strengthens the intuition behind the result. Suppose there are four type-1
states and one type-3 state, with QS = 4 (out of 5) and QH = 4 (out of 7). Then v1 = 2=11
and v3 = 1=11. The strategies supporting this are: type-3 proposers always choose a coalition
with one type-3 district and three type-1 districts, while type-1 proposers mix. They choose
three type-1 partners with probability 1=4, and two type-1's and two type-3's with probability
3=4. In both cases, v1 = 6=11. Note that sometimes a \surplus" coalition is bought in the
10This assumption is made strictly for convenience, to avoid the proliferation of subcases. Note that
this approximates what many consider to be true of the U.S. Congress, in which only the Senate is clearly
supermajoritarian because of the ¯libuster (e.g., Krehbiel 1998).
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House.
4.2. Senate Proposal Power
In the situation studied in Proposition 2, only members of the well-apportioned chamber,
the House, have proposal power. Small state bias can exist when proposals originate in the
malapportioned chamber. In this case, all Senators are assumed to have equal proposal
probabilities, and thus proposal power is maldistributed. When any Senator is chosen he
or she builds a coalition of other Senators and House members and keeps the surplus to
distribute among a majority of his or her own voters. Proposers will spend the same amount
for a coalition as before. However, because a small state has a higher likelihood of making a
proposal than if the legislation were initiated in the House, small states have higher expected
returns.
Aside from Senate proposal power, we maintain all of the assumptions of the model in
Sections 2 and 3. Additionally, as noted in the introduction, the analysis of Senate proposals
also forces us to take a stand on how proposal power is distributed in the Senate. We
will make the simplest assumption|that each senator has equal probability (1=m) of being
recognized to make a proposal. Also, we will assume that the House cannot make proposals
or amendments, but simply passes or rejects proposals that pass the Senate. As a result,
the likelihood that a small state senator is proposer is higher than that state's share of the
population (House seats). The large disparity in proposal probabilities leads to a di®erence
in expected payo®s in which small-state districts receive more than large-state districts.
Proposition 4. If proposals originate in the Senate and n¸ t(2m+1)+ 3, then vt > 1=n.
The condition of the proposition is obviously most easily satis¯ed for small states, thereby
implying that such states are the \¯rst" to receive disproportionately large payo®s. This
occurs because proposal power becomes more important as n increases (holding m constant),
and because districts in small states capture more of the bene¯t of their senator being
proposer. Even if small states are never included in a coalition, their proposal power alone
can give their districts payo®s in excess of 1=n, thus making the proportional equilibrium
identi¯ed in Proposition 2 impossible.
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The condition of the proposition also conveys an intuitive logic about the distribution of
state sizes. Since n ¸ tm, where t is the size of the smallest state, the condition is essentially
that less than half of the districts are in the smallest states. When the condition does
not hold, the distribution of districts across states is relatively even. In this environment,
Senate proposal power does not imply heavily disproportionate \recognition probabilities"
for districts in small states, and so more proportional equilibrium payo®s are possible.
While the conditions of Proposition 4 are su±cient for maldistribution, they are not
necessary. Consider a legislature with two type-1 states and one type-3 state; thus, m = 3,
n = 5, and t(2m+1) + 3 = 10. It is then easily demonstrated that at any SSSPE, the
expected payo®s are approximately v1 = :270 and v3 = :153. So, the expected payo® in the
small-state districts is much higher than that in the large-state districts.
4.3. Lumpy Distributive Goods
Many publicly funded distributive goods are not divisible down to the district level. Oth-
ers produce bene¯ts that spill over into other districts. Examples are inter-state highways,
river navigation projects, large-scale irrigation and hydroelectric power projects, and intra-
city highway, mass-transit or airport projects in large cities that contain several districts.11
If the distributive goods divided by the legislature are \lumpy," then there will typically
be a bias in favor of small states. An extreme case is where the distributive goods are not
divisible within states. A model studied by Kalandrakis (n.d.) covers this case. In his
model, legislators in the upper and lower chamber from any given state have identical utility
functions. Thus, if one House district receives an amount x per capita, then the entire state
containing that district must also receive x per capita.
A simple example provides the intuition about why this situation leads to a small-state
bias. Suppose the distributive goods are completely divisible across states, but they are not
divisible within a state.
11Lumpiness or spillovers may be important in practice. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Woon (1998) study
the public support for initiatives that sought to apportion that state's senate on the basis of area (county)
rather than population. The patterns of voting suggest that the 10 counties around the San Francisco Bay
area bene¯ted from county-based representation in the Senate even though several of them would have lost
seats. By contrast, Los Angeles County represented a similar geographic area, and had no spillovers.
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Example. Suppose there are four type-1 states and one type-3 state; so m = 5 and n = 7.
Then at any SSSPE, the expected payo®s are v1 = 1=6 and v3 = 1=9. So, the expected payo®
in the small-state districts (type-1) is much higher than that in the large-state districts (type-
3).
Because of the assumed indivisibility, there are just two sorts of minimal winning coali-
tions: those consisting of all four type-1 districts, and those consisting of two type-1 districts
and all three type-3 districts. Note also that the indivisibility implies that v3 = vs3.
When the type-3 senator is proposer, she always o®ers v1 to two of the type-1 districts
and the remainder is shared evenly by her own districts. The optimal proposals for the
type-1 senators depend on the relative values of v1 and v3. If 3v1 < v1 + 3v3, then each
type-1 proposer always o®ers v1 to the other three type-1 districts, and keeps the rest for
her own state (district). If 3v1 > v1 + 3v3, then each type-1 proposer always o®ers v1 to one
of the other type-1 districts and v3 to each of the type-3 districts, and keeps the rest for her
own state. If 3v1 = v1 + 3v3, then type-1 proposers are indi®erent between o®ering v1 to
the other three type-1 districts, and o®ering v1 to one of the other type-1 districts and v3 to
each of the type-3 districts. We show that this last condition must hold in equilibrium.
Suppose 3v1 < v1 + 3v3, that is, 2v1 < 3v3. Then v1 = 15[1¡3v1] + 35v1 + 15( 12)v1 (the ¯rst
term covers the case where the given type-1 senator is proposer, the second term covers the
case where one of the other type-1 senators is proposer, and the third terms cover the case
where the type-3 senator is proposer); and v3 = 15(
1
3)[1¡2v1] + 45(0) (the ¯rst term covers
the case where the type-3 senator is proposer, and the second term covers the case where
a type-1 senator is proposer). Solving these two equations yields v1 = 29 and v3 =
1
27. But
then 2v1 = 49 >
1
9 = 3v3, contradicting the assumption that 2v1 < 3v3.
Next, suppose 3v1 > v1+3v3, that is, 2v1 > 3v3. Then v1 = 15[1¡v1¡3v3]+ 35( 13)v1 + 15(12 )v1;
and v3 = 15 (
1
3)[1¡2v1] + 45v3. Solving these two equations yields v1 = 0 and v3 = 13. But then
2v1 = 0 < 1 = 3v3, contradicting the assumption that 2v1 > 3v3.
Thus, at any SSSPE we must have 3v1 = v1 + 3v3, that is 2v1 = 3v3. Let p be the
probability that a type-1 proposer o®ers v1 to the other three type-1 districts, and let 1¡p
be the probability a type-1 proposer o®ers v1 to one of the other type-1 districts and v3
to each of the type-3 districts. Then v1 = 15[1¡ 3v1] + 35[p + (1¡p)( 13)]v1 + 15( 12)v1; and
v3 = 15 (
1
3 )[1¡2v1] + 45(1¡p)v3. Also, since none of the dollar is ever wasted, 4v1 + 3v3 = 1.
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Solving these three equations yields v1 = 1=6, v3 = 1=9, and p = 1=4. (Note that 2v1 = 3v3,
as required.) Since v1 > v3, there is a bias in favor of small-state districts.
Lumpy public expenditure programs violate a key feature of Proposition 1. When goods
are divisible, it is possible to build a minimal winning coalition in the lower house that
guarantees a coalition in the upper house, so the marginal cost of a Senator to a coalition
is zero. That is no longer the case with lumpy goods. The lumpy expenditure assumption
makes the marginal cost of the large state Senator higher than the marginal cost of a small-
state Senator. To buy a Senator from a state with, say, 3 House members, a proposer must
pay the price of all 3 House members. If all members cost the same, then for the same
cost, a proposer could buy 3 House members from small states and get 3 Senators from the
small states. The cost of large states, then, must be higher than the cost of small states.
Recognizing this, small states can command higher (per capita) prices for their membership
in a coalition.
The \lumpy goods" and supermajority results o®er insight about relaxing the assumption
that Senators are responsive to their median voters (A2). So far we have assumed that a
simple majority of districts (a threshold of 50 percent) is needed to gain a Senator's support
for a bill. The lumpy good argument suggests that thresholds above 50 percent imply
small state biases. The highest threshold occurs when a Senator will join a coalition only
if a proposal distributes funds to all districts; that is a completely indivisible good. A
threshold below 50 percent will weaken the pressures toward small state biases. Thinking
about Proposition 2, if a Senator votes for a proposal that gives money to less than half of
a state's House delegation, then it becomes even easier to build minimal winning coalitions
in the House that guarantee a majority in the Senate.
5. Discussion
Geographic linkages across chambers in bicameral legislatures complicate distributive
politics. Unlike unicameral politics, unequal representation in a bicameral legislature does
not lead inexorably to unequal distributions of public expenditures. The need to win in
both chambers tempers the importance of raw voting power in each chamber separately.
When only voting power is unequal and when the lower house districts are nested within
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the geography represented by the upper house, then it is possible to form minimum winnng
coalitions entirely within the House without having to \pay extra" to get the Senate. Other
innequities political power must exist in a bicameral legislature { such as proposal power or
supermajority requirements { in order to generate maldistribution of government expendi-
tures.
Several interesting empirical predictions follow from our analysis. We consider three
brie°y.
First, the e®ects of malapportionment in bicameral legislatures on the distribution of
public funds should depend on the extent to which each of the two chambers deviates from
equal representation. The U.S. state legislatures prior to 1964 provide empirical support for
this general pattern. Many state legislatures paralleled the federal system of representation,
with counties being the analog of the states, but many were also malapportioned in both
chambers. Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2002) show that malapportionment of the
state legislatures strongly a®ected the distribution of public spending. We analyzed the
data they considered with an eye to the speci¯c claim here. We regressed the share of state
transfers received by counties on the counties' representation in the legislature (called the
RRI Index) and other factors, all variables in logarithms. We tested for a di®erential e®ect
of the RRI Index in states where both chambers were badly apportioned and found that
there is a statistically interaction.12
Second, the U. S. Congress is an interesting test case not of the e®ects of malapportion-
ment per se, as is sometimes argued, but of the e®ects of supermajority rules and unequal
proposal power in the face of malapportionment. Consistent with the results in the fourth
section of the paper, Atlas, et al., (1995) and Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) document that
inequitable divisions of federal expenditures are a persistent and striking feature of American
public ¯nance.
Third, our results have implications for preferences over the choice of constitutions and
legislative rules in federal systems. The l¯ibuster in the U.S. Senate provides one important
12The badly apportioned states were the states with the lowest percent of the population required to elect
a majority in both chambers. The coe±cient on RRI (in logarithms) is .15 (se = .013) and the coe±cient on
the interaction term is .06 (se = .016), meaning the slope on representation in the malapportioned states is
substantial larger (i.e., .21 = .15+.06). Other factors in the model are state ¯xed e®ects, county population,
incom, poverty, percent black, percent old, percent school aged, percent unemployed, percent Democratic.
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example. The U.S. Senate determines its own rules about the number of votes required to
end debate. The number of votes required for cloture has varied over time, from two-thirds
of the entire Senate to two-thirds of those present to three-¯fths. Proposition 3 suggests
that Senators from smaller states would favor more stringent requirements for cloture. In
fact, this seems to be the case. Senator Harry Reid (D,NV) put it as follows: \Checks and
balances has nothing to do with protecting a small state. Vetoes have nothing to do with
it, unless you have the ear of the Chief Executive of this country. The ¯libuster is uniquely
situated to protect a small state in population like Nevada" (Binder and Smith, 1997, page
98). Dozens of roll call votes have been taken on this issue over the years. Binder and Smith
(1997) study these votes and ¯nd that, even after controlling for party, ideology, region, and
other factors, there is a tendency for Senators from smaller states to favor more stringent
requirements for cloture.13
These empirical patterns support the basic idea forwarded here { that malapportionment
in bicameral legislatures depends not only on the constitution of the representative body
but on the rules of the chambers. To make our basic point, we have focused on distributive
politics under some restrictive assumptions, and a more extensive analysis will yield further
insights.
xxxx This isn't right xxxx One important extension of our analysis is to the situation
where bills are considered under an open rule. This situation is considerably more compli-
cated; it requires further assumptions about how the chambers resolve di®erences between
them. Drawing on the logic above, our intuition is that the open rule will further reduce the
e®ects of malapportionment. In the unicameral setting, open rules eliminate the bargaining
advantages of the proposer, because the amendment process allows the legislature to redis-
tribute the rents that the proposer would have otherwise kept. In the bicameral setting, the
proposal power of small-state Senators produces a bias because they have a higher probabil-
ity of getting the rents from being proposer. If those rents were reduced, as may occur with
13Actually, Binder and Smith argue that their evidence shows weak support for the hypothesis that small
states favor the ¯libuster. In particular, they ¯nd a statistically signi¯cant positive e®ect of the \small-state"
dummy in only 2 out of the 12 roll calls they examined. A closer look, however, shows that the e®ect is
quite strong. First, in 10 out of 12 cases the e®ect is in the right direction|small state senators supporting
a more stringent cloture rule. Second, they examine only a subset of all the roll calls on cloture reform. We
pooled all of the relevant data for the post-World War II period|69 roll calls in all|and ¯nd a large and
highly signi¯cant \small-state Senator" e®ect. (The details of this analysis are available upon request).
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open rules, then the biases would be smaller. Indeed, this is one justi¯cation for political
reforms calling for more open political processes.
A second possible extension is to change the policy space, by adding an ideological di-
mension to the simple division of the public dollar. Politicians may use public expenditures
to \buy" votes in the ideological domain. Standard results suggest that moderates on the
ideological dimension may command higher prices. That intuition might be altered in a
bicameral setting.
A ¯nal generalization is to allow legislatures to determine the rules under which divide-
the-dollar politics will occur. Diermeier and Myerson (1999) argue that the two chambers in
a bicameral legislature will erect countervailing hurdles, thereby equalizing the institutional
power of the chambers. That analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik index to evaluate
legislators' payo®s. Our intuition is that under the legislative bargaining model that result
no longer holds. Depending on their numbers, small-state Senators may be able to im-
pose supermajority requirements, skewing the division of public expenditures toward their
constituents.
In addition to these positive predictions, our results carry an important normative lesson.
Bicameral legislatures may undo or mute the e®ects of unequal representation. Without
bicameral structures it may be di±cult to constitute a legislature or a union, as was the
case with the American constitution 200 years ago and the European Union today. The
challenge for institutional design is how to give states some representation without giving
them excessive political power. Our results turn the common objection to bicameralism
on its head. In a unicameral legislature, it seems impossible to guarantee representation of
states and population without skew the distribution of political power. However, in bicameral
legislatures, it is possible. When votes are unequal in one chamber, but proposal power is
equal and laws are passed with majority rule, bargaining in bicameral legislatures produces
fair expected divisions of public expenditures.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Expanding, n(C) =
PT
t=1mt(C)(t+1)=2 =
1
2
PT
t=1mt(C)t+
1
2
PT
t=1mt(C) =
1
2
PT
t=1mt(C)t+ (m+1)=4: Now, (n+1)=2 =
1
2
PT
t=1mtt+
1
2, so n(C) · (n+1)=2 if and only
if 12
PT
t=1mt(C)t + (m+1)=4 · 12
PT
t=1mtt +
1
2 , or (m¡1)=2 ·
PT
t=1[mt¡mt(C)]t. Now,PT
t=1[mt¡mt(C)] = m¡ (m+1)=2 = (m¡1)=2, and t ¸ 1 for all t, so the desired inequality
holds. Moreover, the inequality is strict unless mt(C) = mt for all t with t > 1. Note that
for each t, the term mt¡mt(C) is the number of type-t states that are not in M(C). So, the
inequality is strict unless M(C) contains all states with t > 1.
Proof of Lemma. Suppose otherwise. This clearly implies the existence of a type t0 such that
representatives receive vst0 < vt0 with positive probability. Let W 2 W represent an optimal
winning coalition in which a type-t0 representative, k0, receives xk 0 = vst0. This implies three
facts. First, W contains no \surplus" legislators of type t0 (i.e., all type t0 states have either 0
or dt0 representatives receiving xk > 0). Second, m(W) = M+12 , for otherwise Wnfk0g 2 W.
Third, m(W) = M+12 and Proposition 1 imply the existence of a type t
00 6= t0 that contains
surplus legislators receiving vt. In order for W to be optimal, all surplus legislators must be
of the least expensive type, and so t00 2 ftjvt = minfvtgg.
The existence of a type t00 surplus legislator implies that vt00+vst0 < vt0. Thus the proposer
would replace as many type t0 legislators with type t00 (or identically inexpensive) legislators
as possible. There are two cases. First, some type t0 legislators receive vt0 and all type t00
legislators receive vt00 (i.e., qt00 = 1). This generates an obvious contradiction of (1). Second,
no type t0 legislators receive vt0 (i.e., qt0 = 0). Let ½st and ½t represent the equilibrium
probabilities that a type-t senator receives vst and vt, respectively. Then v
s
t = ½
s
tv
s
t + ½tvt,
and qt0 = 0 implies ½t0 = 0, so ½st0 = 1. Thus, every type-t0 state has dt0 representatives
receiving vst0 and t
0¡dt0 representatives receiving 0. An identical argument applies for all
types in W containing a representative who receives vst < vt.
Denote by A the set of all representatives receiving vst < v
s
t . Then W = A [B, where
n(A) = 0, n(B) ¸ N+12 , m(A) > 0, and m(B) < M+12 . Note that the number of surplus
representatives must satisfy s^ < dt00, for otherwise a type-t00 senator could be bought and
a senator from A dropped. So, other than these s^ representatives, all representatives in B
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must be among the dt necessary to buy their state's senator. But since m(B) < M+12 , by
Proposition 1 n(B) < N+12 : contradiction. Thus no coalition containing a payment of v
s
t < vt
can be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2. (Existence) To show existence, note that in such an equilibrium,
Proposition 1 implies that exactly (n¡ 1)=2 legislators receive vt. Thus, v t is constant
across t, and expression (1) implies that qt is also constant across t. Thus qt = 1=2 for all
types. It is su±cient to identify a proposal strategy for any proposer i such that, ex ante,
Prfxk = vtjk6= ig = Prfxk = 0jk6= ig = 1=2, subject to the constraint that at least (m+1)=2
states receive at least vt in more than half of their districts. Let i belong to state j of type
~t, and let Sj denote the set of states not including j. We de¯ne the following (random)
partition of Sj: let S1 consist of one state from each type t 6= ~t such that mt is odd, and
one from type ~t if m~t ¡1 is odd. Let S2 = SjnS1 (that is, the largest subset of Sj such that
the number of states of each type is even). Note that jS1j and jS2j must both be even. We
assign xk = vt across districts as follows (all other districts receive xk = 0):
1. In S2: for each type t 6= ~t (t = ~t), choose mt=2 ((mt¡1)=2) states at random, and
assign xk = vt to all representatives in these states.
2. If ~t is odd, then in S1: the number of districts in S1 is even. Thus, there exists a
partition fS l1gl=1;:::;jS1j=2 such that for each l, S l1 contains a pair of states, both with
either odd or even numbers of districts. For each S l1, label the member states j l0 and
jl00, of types tl0 and tl00 respectively, where tl0 < tl00. With probability 1=2, assign xk = vt
randomly to (tl
0
+ tl
00
)=2 representatives in state jl
00
, and with probability 1=2, assign
xk = vt to all representatives in state jl
0 and randomly to (tl00¡tl0)=2 representatives
in state j l00.
In state j: assign xk = vt randomly to (~t¡1)=2 representatives.
3. If ~t is even, then in S1 and state j : the number of districts in S1 is odd. Thus, there
exists a state j^ of type t^, where t^ is odd. Suppose that ~t¡1 · t^. Then with probability
1=2, assign xk = vt randomly to (t^+ ~t¡ 1)=2 representatives in state j^, and with
probability 1=2, assign xk = vt to all representatives except i in state j and randomly
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to (t^¡~t+1)=2 representatives in state j^. A symmetrical result holds for ~t¡1 > t^. For
the set of states in S1nfj^g, follow the procedure in step 2 for S1, replacing S1 with
S1nfj^g.
Given these proposal strategies, and letting vt = 1=n for all t, it is easily veri¯ed that (1)
holds for all types. Further, since vs1 · v1 trivially and only one district can receive strictly
more than vt, vst · vt for all types, as required.
(Uniqueness of Expected Payo®s) To prove that vt = 1=n for all t, suppose to the contrary
that there is an SSSPE with some type t such that vt 6= 1=n. Without loss of generality,
let vc = mintfvtg and ve = maxtfvtg. Clearly, vc < 1=n < ve. We show this leads to a
contradiction.
Consider the set of representatives from states with vt = ve, and let A denote the
representatives from the largest type in this set. Note two facts that follow from equation
(1). First, if qt = 0, then vt = (1¡ vt)=n < 1=n. Second, if qt = 1, then vt = (1¡vt) > 1=n.
There are two cases.
Case 1: m1 < (m¡1)=2. There are two subcases: (i) m(A) · (m¡1)=2 and (ii) m(A) ¸
(m+1)=2. In (i), a cheapest coalition always includes (m+1)=2 states in NnA and none from
A. If n(A) < (n+1)=2, then qt = 0 and ve < 1=n for all representatives in A: contradiction. If
n(A) ¸ (n+1)=2, then qt = 1 and vt > 1=n > vc for all representatives in NnA: contradiction.
So (ii) must hold. In this subcase a cheapest coalition always includes a minimum winning
majority in all states with representatives in NnA, plus (m+1)=2 ¡ m(NnA) states from
A. Since cheapest coalitions include one or more representatives of each type, there exists a
cheapest coalition for each proposer that includes herself; thus, vt = v for all t. Substituting
into equation (1),
vt =
1¡ v
(n¡1)(1¡qt) :
Obviously, vt is strictly increasing in qt. The fact that a cheapest coalition always includes
a minimum winning majority in all states with representatives in NnA means that qt > 1=2
for all representatives in NnA. Since cheapest minimum winning coalitions include exactly
(n+1)=2 representatives, they never include more than half of representatives in A; thus,
qt < 1=2 for all representatives in A. This implies vt is larger for representatives in NnA
than for those in A: contradiction.
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Case 2: m1 ¸ (m¡1)=2. There are two subcases: (i) A consists of type 1 representatives,
and (ii) A does not. In (i), if m1 = (m¡1)=2, then a winning coalition can be drawn from types
t6= 1. This implies q1 = 0 and v1 < 1=n: contradiction. If m1 > (m¡1)=2, then subcase (ii)
of Case 1 applies. In (ii), if m(A) · (m¡1)=2 then qt = 0 and ve < 1=n for representatives
in A: contradiction. Otherwise, m(A) = (m+1)=2 so q1 = 1 and vt > 1=n > vc for all
representatives in NnA: contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose QS > rk+QH¡(kmk+1)=2 and vk ¸ v1. We show this
leads to a contradiction. If vk > v1, then vk > 1=n > v1. In this case, if m1 ¸ QH and
m1 ¸ QS, then qk = 0, and so vk < 1=n: contradiction. Otherwise, q1 = 1 and thus v1 > 1=n:
contradiction.
Thus vk = v1 = 1=n. In this case, since there are only two types, there exists a least-cost
coalition that includes both type-1 and type-k representatives, which implies that vk = v1 =
v. Since (n+1)=2 · QH < n, this implies 1=2 < qk = q1 < 1. So, there exist optimal
winning coalitions that do not contain all type-1 representatives. Any such coalition must
have exactly QH representatives, and therefore costs v = QH=n. Thus, all optimal winning
coalitions must have exactly QH representatives (and cost v = QH=n). Consider a coalition
with QH representatives, at least (kmk+1)=2 of which are of type-k. This coalition can win
no more than rk+QH¡(kmk+1)=2 senators, where rk = b(kmk+1)=(k+1)c. (This is achieved
by distributing (kmk+1)=2 payouts of vk to (k+1)=2 districts in as many type-k states as
possible. The remaining QH¡(kmk+1)=2 districts are allocated to type-1 states.) Note that
the assumption QH < m1 +(kmk+1)=2 (made in the text) ensures that there are enough
type-1 districts to make this distribution feasible. Thus, since QS > rk+QH¡(kmk+1)=2 by
assumption, it is impossible to construct a coalition that contains exactly QH representatives,
has at least (kmk+1)=2 members in type-k districts, and wins the Senate. So, qk < 1=2 < q1:
contradiction. Thus, if QS > rk+QH¡(kmk+1)=2, then vk < v1.
Finally, when QS · rk+QH¡(kmk+1)=2, an argument analogous to Proposition 2 shows
that v1 = vk = 1=N (i.e., no small state bias exists).
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose otherwise (i.e., vt · 1=n). By the lemma, no representative
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receives an allocation in (0; vt). This implies that under an optimal allocation for any senator:
1
n
¸ 1
m
dt
t
1
dt
·
1¡
µn + 1
2
¡ dt
¶ 1
n
¸
+
m¡ 1
m
qt
1
n
:
where qt represents the average probability of being included in a coalition, conditional on
not being the proposer. Collecting terms, this implies:
m ¸ 1
t
·
n¡
µn + 1
2
¡ dt
¶¸
+ (m¡ 1)qt;
and thus:
qt · tm ¡ (n¡ 1)=2 + dtt(m¡ 1) :
This implies qt < 0, generating a contradiction, if tm < (n¡1)=2¡dt, or: n > 2(tm+dt)+1.
Since 2dt + 1 · t + 3, the condition is satis¯ed if n > t(2m+ 1) + 3. If m1 ¸ 1, v1 > 1=n if
n > 2m+3.
Note that by substituting equalities for the inequalities, the expressions above also imply
that an equilibrium in which vt = 1=n for all t is impossible if qt > 1. This occurs if
t > (n¡ 1)=2 ¡ dt, or: n < 2(t+ dt) + 1, which is satis¯ed if n < 3t+ 2 for some t.
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